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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the current state of entrepreneurship theory in the public 
domain and proposes a theoretical framework applying the concepts of entrepreneurship 
developed by I. M. Kirzner and J. A. Schumpeter in the field of economics to the field of 
public policy. A distinction is made between political and policy entrepreneurship. Three 
generic policy entrepreneurship functions (policy leadership, innovation and coordination) 
which are performed by specific means by a variety of actors scattered across the policy 
system, are identified. It is shown that these entrepreneurial functions can provide a complete 
explanation of adjustments taking place during policy regime formation (including agenda 
setting and policy negotiation). It is postulated that during this process (denoted as policy 
equilibration), the complementarity of entrepreneurship functions is essential. The paper also 
considers possible exercise of policy entrepreneurship functions in the trade policy domain 
and examines what actors can act as entrepreneurs. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; trade policy; agenda setting 
JEL Classification: D78, F13, L26 
1. Introduction 
The concept of entrepreneurship is frequently used in political and policy science. The 
existing literature on policy formation and change provides a non-functional view of the 
entrepreneur, without due consideration of activities of entrepreneurs in policy regime 
formation, institutional construction, effectiveness of entrepreneurial action, and behavioural 
factors that constrain or enable policy entrepreneurship (Shockley, 2007). In addition, there is 
a tendency to reduce public entrepreneurs to a specific case of politician in an electoral 
market (Wagner, 1966; François, 2003), creator of interest groups (Salisbury, 1969) or 
supplier of public goods (Ostrom, 1964). 
This paper extends the entrepreneurship concepts of I. M. Kirzner and J. A. Schumpeter to 
the field of public policy. We argue that such extension allows a more complete picture of 
policy entrepreneurship that: 
1) Emphasises entrepreneurial function, rather than lists particular entrepreneurs; 
2) Establishes the collective nature of policy entrepreneurship; and 
3) Identifies generic entrepreneurial functions that are performed in all instances of 
policy construction (Kirznerian coordination and Schumpeterian leadership and 
recombination). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 checks whether it is necessary at all to introduce 
this concept and whether current literature on public policy reserves a place for such an 
analytical novelty. In Sections 3 and 4 we argue that by extending the ideas of I. M. Kirzner 
and J. A. Schumpeter initially formulated in the economic domain, to the public policy field, 
the issue of policy dynamics becomes substantially clarified. We indicate in particular 
differences between political and policy entrepreneurship, the former being of interest in 
terms of politicians’ behaviour and operation of a political market, and the latter being 
essential for the analysis of actual policy formulation. We also identify three functions that 
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are typically performed by policy entrepreneurs and postulate their complementarity. Section 
5 examines the complementarity of policy entrepreneurship functions. Section 6 provides 
discussion of policy entrepreneurship in the trade policy domain. Section 7 summarises the 
discussion. 
2. Entrepreneurship in public policy literature 
Theoretical and empirical literature on public policy formulation has not reached agreement 
as to the role of the public entrepreneur (and policy entrepreneur as its specific sub-type). 
Some authors (Harberger, 1993) argue that public entrepreneurs exist and, importantly, being 
endowed with leadership and political skills, enact reforms that set respective countries on 
higher growth paths, than would have been possible in their absence. In contrast, others 
(Kirchgässner, 2002; Feld, Schnellenbach, 2007) assert that public entrepreneurs in normal 
circumstances play a minimal role: they rise to prominence only during historic 
transformations, whereas in more or less stable and functioning political and economic 
systems, more moderate tinkering with formal institutions is sufficient to enact necessary 
changes. In this respect it is argued that as institutions (rules and procedures) have a decisive 
influence on political behaviour, the specific entrepreneurial qualities (political ability, 
vision) matter less for policy dynamics. No heroic figures are necessary with changes made 
by “average moral human beings.”(Kirchgässner, 2002: 185)  
Most of the analyses that contend that public entrepreneurship matters nonetheless lack the 
solid foundations of the concept that have been provided for decades in economic theory. 
These analyses either reduce entrepreneurship to a specific case of government decision 
making, such as appraisal of legislative documents by Congress entrepreneurs or public 
entrepreneurship by senators (Schiller, 1995; Wawro, 2000); to organisation of collective 
action (Ostrom, 1964; Frohlich et al, 1971); vote maximisation by a politician (François, 
2003); or they conceptualise it broadly as various activities improving the functioning of the 
public domain (Boyett, 1997).  
We argue that for the concept of entrepreneurship to obtain real analytical power and 
standing in public policy analysis, it is necessary firstly, to separate policy entrepreneurship 
(that plays role in creation, dismantling and reform of particular policies) from political 
entrepreneurship (that includes activities of politicians targeted at increasing the likelihood of 
being re-/elected and improving their standing in the political system) and from a broader 
case of public entrepreneurship that, in addition to the above two types, includes activities in 
non-government areas (e.g. local community entrepreneurship). Secondly, it is essential to 
define who the policy entrepreneur is and which particular functions he/she performs (beyond 
the mere statement that he/she is responsible for bringing in novelties and changes in the 
policy system), as well as to work out in detail which factors (entrepreneurs’ capability and 
personal characteristics or his/her environment) assist or hamper the exercise of 
entrepreneurship. To remedy the vagueness and ambiguity of the concept (and hence its 
limited applicability to the analysis of policies), in the following section we devise several 
middle-level propositions with regard to entrepreneurship.  
It is proposed in this paper that policy entrepreneurship (similarly to the economic version) is 
a multidimensional concept presupposing that entrepreneurs have several modi operandi; 
hence a single theory cannot depict the phenomenon in its entirety. We argue that if the 
driving forces of policy dynamics are to be established, two principal roles of entrepreneurs 
can be envisaged – the role of an actor, making the change by different means, and the role of 
an actor, contributing to and facilitating the change. We argue that the analysis of the former 
role can be performed by extending the theory of J. A. Schumpeter to the policy domain, 
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whereas in the analysis of the latter we can apply the theory of entrepreneurship developed by 
I. M. Kirzner in the Austrian school of economics. 
3. Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
The theory of entrepreneurship developed by I. M. Kirzner (1973; 1997a) rests of the 
distinction between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial (economising) types of 
behaviour. Economising behaviour requires perfect knowledge and information, i.e. if 
“individual knows with certainty what to expect, his plans can be completely explained in 
terms of economizing, of optimal allocation, and of maximizing”. (1973: 37) In contrast, if 
dispersed knowledge or bounded rationality and information imperfections are present, actors 
will tend to make actors make inferior plans – “either plans that are doomed to 
disappointment or plans which fail to exploit existing market opportunities.” (1973: 10) 
The former plans are optimistically made in anticipation that certain events or decisions of 
other actors will realise them: for instance, in product and factor markets, the buyers may set 
their bids at a low level, anticipating that sellers will accept them, and sellers will set offers at 
an inadequately high level, expecting that buyers will purchase at these prices. In both cases, 
the plans are not realised with buyers unable to buy all the goods they want and sellers left 
with unsold goods. Both are failing to recognise that superior plans could have included 
setting prices higher or lower. Kirzner denotes this type of market participants’ mistake as the 
“over-optimism” mistake. (1999: 6) 
The latter plans, having been made, reveal that alternative courses of action could have 
delivered better results: buyers/sellers discover ex post that goods could have been 
bought/sold cheaper/dearer elsewhere, and hence the market opportunities have not been 
exploited fully. (1973: 14) This type of mistake is denoted as the “over-pessimism” mistake. 
(1999: 6) 
The function of the entrepreneur is crucial in this respect: Kirzner acknowledges that market 
participants may be deficient in their ability to learn from previously made mistakes and that 
there is no guarantee that the correction of misallocations in disequilibrium will be speedy 
and successful. The entrepreneur would compensate for actors’ frequent inability to learn and 
thus ensure that market process results in the improvements of plans and decisions.  
The market process would then take the following form: the entrepreneur, seeing a profitable 
opportunity in a market in disequilibrium (in the product markets this comes as a price 
discrepancy), buys cheap and sells dear and arbitrages away the profit opportunity, 
eliminating disequilibrium, thus leading the system to an optimal allocation of resources to 
more highly valued uses, that is, to equilibrium. Overall, the function of a Kirznerian 
entrepreneur in the market economy is to correct imperfections and to ensure, by discovering 
and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities that disequilibrium situations do not persist for 
long. Kirzner (1997b) argues that the critical capability that determines entrepreneurial 
discovery and the execution of the entrepreneurial function is alertness, defined as ability on 
the part of the entrepreneur to be aware of opportunities and “of what has been overlooked. 
The essence of entrepreneurship consists in seeing through the fog created by the uncertainty 
of the future.” (1997b: 51)  
The application of the Kirznerian entrepreneurship concept in the public domain is justified 
by the presence of the processual complexity in policymaking and the uncertainties of 
politics.  
Processual complexity stems from structural features of the policy system, such as 
interlocking and overlapping sources of authority and control – the separation of powers and 
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multiple levels of decision making (federalism or the EC-type decision structure, involving 
national and supranational actors), but also from multidimensional relations between private 
and public agents and particularly from their diverse motives, behaviours and objectives. 
Hence, at the core of processual complexity is a high possibility that any policy initiative gets 
hampered or delayed as a result of these features. Before being formalised and accepted, 
initiative is tested and challenged by opposition and modified by actors submitting alternative 
proposals. This clearly means challenges for those aspiring to reform, and the exercise of 
Kirznerian policy entrepreneurship would necessarily include the reduction of this 
complexity by judicious coordination of individual plans such as policy views and objectives 
that would help actors to reduce their mutual ignorance and eliminate mistakes.  
Uncertainties of political processes imply unpredictability of political outcomes: the 
frustration of plans of some actors, their surprises and wrong expectations are mirrored by the 
plentiful profit opportunities for others. Sheingate (2003: 191-192) mentions some of them. 
Unexpected election results (despite the attempts of politicians to make elections as 
predictable as possible) mean that additional profits, coming in the form of extra votes, may 
be made at the expense of political incumbents. Crisis situations that make policies 
unsustainable as well as new policy issues which are not yet recognised, may give 
opportunities to a politician to take advantage by capitalising on these situations. The latent 
or nascent demand for policy changes, resulting from the public dissatisfaction with existing 
policies or from the attractiveness of alternatives, may give an individual politician or social 
movement a chance to improve political standing (Schnellenbach, 2007: 192).  
As opposed to Kirznerian political entrepreneurship model that considers exploitation of 
political profit opportunities in the electoral market (Wagner, 1996; François, 2003), 
Kirznerian policy entrepreneurship model looks at several specific aspects of policymaking. 
Firstly, it is common that politicians engage in electoral competition not merely to secure a 
political post, but rather to achieve some higher order goals – to introduce policy 
improvements, to avert policy change and so on. The electoral win would therefore be one of 
the instruments to attain the ultimate goal – to get ideas and proposals embodied in policy. 
Indeed, under different circumstances, as well as formal and informal institutions, politicians 
would recourse to other means of accessing their policy objectives (e.g. to dictatorship or to 
overhaul of the institutional structure).  
Secondly, in cases when political developments (e.g. election) precede policy innovations, 
there may be no causality between the two. Policymaking realities evidence that, in many 
cases, after elections ambitious politicians did not turn into radical policy entrepreneurs, or 
enacted only incremental changes or turned out to be conservatives. Also major policy 
changes could have taken place irrespective of the electoral cycle. In the instances when 
political developments condition policy developments, the former do not have to come in the 
form of elections: for instance, they may take the form of bureaucratic and intra-
governmental turnover.  
Thirdly, the implementation of political programs and the fulfilment of electoral promises 
happens only through the creation of new policies or modification of the old ones, which 
makes a politician’s program subject to the complexities of the policy negotiation, with the 
former becoming one of the many inputs that are moulded and transformed in the national 
and international policymaking “machine” before the policy output is generated.  
Fourthly, the politician’s program itself is a product of the policy system: it is unlikely to 
come ex nihilo or to be a creation of a single politician. Instead, it bears the stamp of various 
policy ideologies and concurrent visions in the surrounding policy environment.  
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Finally, the complexities of policy development and the multiple influences of the 
environment on the policymaker mean that it is not desirable to simplify the policy-making 
reality by drawing a clear borderline between those who introduce policy changes 
(entrepreneurs) and those who do not (bureaucrats and others) and by limiting 
entrepreneurship to a single actor. L. von Mises pointed to the universality of 
entrepreneurship: “This function of entrepreneurship is not the particular feature of a special 
group or class of men; it is inherent in every action and burdens every actor.”(Mises, 1996: 
252-253) Kirzner echoes this view, noting that “instead of rigid compartmentalization of 
roles … we could simply recognize an entrepreneurial aspect to the activities of each market 
participant.”(Kirzner, 1973: 15) Indeed, as shown further in this chapter, Kirznerian policy 
entrepreneurship is performed within the policy system by the same actors who in other 
circumstances could have behaved un-entrepreneurially. 
Thus, it is more realistic to see Kirznerian entrepreneurship as a set of activities of various 
policy actors (including elected politicians) targeted at coordination of the policy process.  
Precisely, the coordination function is required because: 
1) Policy actors may lack an agreement on whether and when a policy problem should 
be attended to and on how to induce the rest of the policy community to act. In 
addition, the opening negotiation proposals may be based on unsubstantiated 
expectations about other actors’ compliance. Hence, there is tendency to enter the 
policy process in an over-optimistic way, assuming that agreements and the positions’ 
fit would be achieved easily (Kirzner’s over-optimism mistake). 
2) Policy actors may be deficient (due to ignorance, or incapacity) in making use of 
means (negotiation strategies and tactics) to attain policy agreement. At any time 
during policy negotiation, there would be “unpleasant” discoveries that the full 
negotiation process potential has not been exploited, such as that the negotiation could 
have proceeded in a more speedy fashion, that better moves could have been made, or 
that certain actions should have been avoided (Kirzner’s over-pessimism mistake). 
The reality of policymaking is that it is highly likely that tedious talks (about whether to deal 
with a policy problem, and about when and how to deal) with stalemates, reversals and 
confrontation will substantially delay the adoption of the new policy or preclude it altogether. 
If this were not the case, i.e. if actors were quick in agreeing to solve the problem and if their 
proposals perfectly dovetailed, the policy negotiation would quickly terminate and no 
exercise of coordination function would be required. Agenda setting would be instantaneous, 
and the very first meeting of the parties would eventuate in consensus. As a result, the 
detailed agreement would quickly follow (no sophisticated tactics to buy opposition would be 
needed) and the agreement would perfectly satisfy the initial plans of the parties (hence there 
would be no need to re-negotiate). This hypothetical situation is clearly at variance with 
policy realities, meaning that actors’ behaviour and their mistakes are conceptually similar 
both in product and factor markets and in the policy system. 
Regarding over-optimism mistakes, it is important to stress that while in Kirznerian analysis 
actors make bids and offers over existing objects of purchase and sale, in the policy process 
the latter have to be defined first. Hence, actors have to establish whether the conditions 
should be classified as problems and this can become the first source of “over-optimism” in 
the process. Policy actors interested in the establishment of new policy equilibrium may find 
that their arguments about the necessity of the change are not attended to or accepted by the 
opposition, either due to their ignorance or vested interests in the existing protectionist 
policies. In addition they may mistakenly believe that their policy proposals are attractive to 
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the opposition.
i
 The latter, in a similar fashion, finds that their earlier expectations, that status 
quo will not be disturbed and that policy issues will not be put on agenda, were not realised; 
they also mistakenly believe that pro-reform actors are satisfied with the opposition’s 
negotiation position and proposals that reform should not take place.  
This situation is analogous to the one, depicted by Kirzner – in both cases (market and policy 
process) overoptimism about actors’ own plans (prices in the former and policy proposals in 
the latter) and about the willingness of the other side to accept them, leads to subsequent 
frustration; thus, preventing actors from reaching a correct estimate of each other’s 
willingness to buy and sell. As a result, the purchase-sale transaction does not take place and 
both market and policy systems are in disequilibrium. In the policy system, the lack of 
agreement about the necessity and timing of a transaction and divergence of prices between 
pro- and anti-reform actors prevents them from achieving stable order. We hypothesize that 
Kirznerian coordination to minimise the over-optimism mistake includes activities that 
facilitate agenda formation (persuasion of reluctant actors to tackle the problem and 
identification of external conditions that can assist this task) as well as activities at the 
negotiation stage that moderate negotiation positions and proposals.  
The over-pessimism mistake, mentioned by Kirzner (recognition by buyers/sellers that 
completed transactions had been suboptimal and that they had not fully exploited profit 
opportunities) is also encountered in the policy equilibration context. It is important to stress 
however, that profit opportunities that arise from possibilities for profitable exchange (i.e. 
from spatial and temporal price discrepancies in economic markets or differentials in 
electoral markets) are not present in the policy system. While in the product and factor 
markets there already exist goods with respect to which arbitrage and speculation can be 
performed and profits extracted, in the policy system this good (future) policy has yet to be 
devised during negotiations. Consequently, there are no profit opportunities as originally 
defined by Kirzner. However, if we view profit as a potential benefit, (rather than an 
exchange discrepancy) for pro-reform actors that is experienced once the new policy is 
attained, the speedy termination of a negotiation process that would deliver these benefits can 
be seen as a profit opportunity for those actors. In this respect, Kirznerian coordination will 
include activities to exploit this profit opportunity: utilisation of the whole arsenal of strategic 
and tactical means to foster the negotiation process in order to achieve a new policy (both 
adversarial actions that make the opposition more pliant, as well as offers that could benefit 
all parties). Inability to handle and manage the policy negotiation process would then be a 
failure of Kirznerian entrepreneurship, even if initial consensus to attend to the policy 
problem and realistic expectations of the opposing party’s position are present.  
The above extension of Kirznerian entrepreneurship, in our opinion, satisfies the analytic 
requirements of entrepreneurial versus non-entrepreneurial behaviour, outlined by Kirzner. 
Firstly, regarding the core requirement of alertness (ability of entrepreneurs to discern profit 
opportunities), Endres and Woods (2006: 194) suggest seeing it as a scarce property, a “gift” 
that is not common to the majority of actors, which is “activated by price signals of potential 
gain … in a specific temporal and local situation…” We similarly postulate that in policy 
setting, alertness cannot be the ever present capability of all actors; otherwise, if all policy 
process discrepancies were discovered by many alert participants, the policy negotiation 
would quickly terminate, which contradicts empirical facts. 
Secondly, Endres and Woods (2006: 193) outline several conditions that represent the scarce 
ability to exploit the profit opportunity – another feature of entrepreneurial behaviour. Our 
view of profit exploitation is not inconsistent with the one advanced by these authors. The 
ability to manage the policy process is not evenly spread across policy actors (point 4 of 
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Endres and Woods) and activated by them (point 3); it is not a matter of luck (point 8) or an 
ex ante probabilistic calculation of all process contingencies (points 6 and 7), this ability is 
not acquired easily and instantly (point 2) but instead comes gradually through participation 
in the policy process (point 5). 
Thirdly, elimination of the above-mentioned mistakes and coordination of policy process 
brings stability (equilibrium) to the policy system (attainment of new policy or re-
establishment of old one) and thereby satisfies Kirzner’s requirement that equilibration is 
necessarily entrepreneurship. In contrast inability to perform policy coordination and attain 
policy equilibrium is a lack (absence) of entrepreneurship. 
Fourthly, as to the motivation of the Kirznerian entrepreneur, it may be argued that the 
extension of the Kirzner’s idea of an agent, equilibration the market, to the analysis of the 
collective and policy action problems may be erroneous. On this point there exists an obvious 
contradiction in the Austrian school theorising. On the one hand, the private entrepreneur is 
set against the state (government); the latter is seen capable to manage the economy and 
execute the orders from higher-level layers of the government system. It, however, cannot 
discover opportunities and capitalize on them (the argument, explaining the rigidity and the 
lack of dynamics in managed and socialist economies). On the other hand, many states 
(particularly in East Asia) did behave like Kirznerian entrepreneurs, successfully detecting 
opportunities for a national economic development and quickly correcting previously made 
policy mistakes (Yu, 2001). This line of theorizing is indeed consistent with the above-
mentioned insight of Mises on the omnipresence of an entrepreneurial function. If it is 
“present in every action”, then it would be unscientific to exclude the possibility of the state 
and bureaucratic entrepreneurship. This would be a purely ideologically-motivated move. 
The future research in the theory of entrepreneurship would reconcile the individual and 
collective aspects of policy entrepreneurship. This paper is one of the steps in this direction.      
Summarising, we advance the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 The essence of Kirznerian entrepreneurship in the policy domain is 
coordination of the policy process, consisting of consensus building and management 
activities in negotiation process. The former involve elimination of inconsistencies and misfit 
between various actors both at initial stages, when the policy problem is defined, and at later 
stages, when negotiation proposals are submitted. The latter involve activities to release 
negotiation constraints and to minimize wrangles and stalemates.     
4. Schumpeterian entrepreneurship      
Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship was originally elaborated in the economic domain 
and is the core part of Schumpeter’s grand theory of socio-economic evolution.  
The entrepreneur is seen by Schumpeter as a powerful endogenous driver of capitalist 
development that brings novelties into the economic system by means of leadership (Ebner, 
2006). The specific emphasis on leadership is at the core of the Schumpeterian view of 
history and society. It is argued that while the dominant values and behaviour in capitalism 
conform to rationalist logic that can be reduced to a large extent to naked profit motive, the 
pre-capitalist modes of behaviour (manifested differently in each national economic setting) 
are nonetheless present.  
Leaders, in this conceptualisation, are the carriers of these ideologies, values and behaviours 
which are alien to the dominant capitalist logic. While the rational maximiser is an actor 
conforming to capitalist requirements, behaving in a routine adaptive fashion in an already 
established institutional and organisational setting, the entrepreneur is an opposite 
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sociological type. He/she is the person akin to visionary and hero (rather than ordinary 
bourgeois), who is driven by atavistic pre-capitalist and quite irrational instincts (striving to 
expand, conquer and dominate, experiencing the joy of creating new things, leading others 
and starting new business ventures and the like), who, due to his/her strength and vitality, is 
able to overhaul entire economic sectors and open new avenues for economic development. 
Importantly, material benefits associated with entrepreneurship are never an end in 
themselves, but rather means to achieve the above-mentioned non-material goals. In 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Schumpeter (1942/1987) extended this concept of 
leadership to the public domain. 
Schumpeter stated firstly, that entrepreneurial leadership is a phenomenon that is not 
confined solely to economic domain, but also universally observed in politics and public 
decision making. “Collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership – this is the 
dominant mechanism of practically any collective action.” (Schumpeter, 1942/1987: 270)  
Secondly, he proposed a theory of decision making in democratic societies based on the 
elitist form of leadership, envisaging a role for the political leader very similar to the heroic 
economic entrepreneur. The leader was seen as a person who is running for office or 
vigorously competing for leadership and attempting to corrupt the opposition, break the 
existing political arrangements and establish himself/herself as a political monopolist. This 
necessarily implied a specific relation with the general public and the institutional 
environment. Regarding the relationship with the former, Schumpeter stressed the ignorance 
and passiveness of voters and private citizens and the ability of political leaders to mould and 
design public opinion and preferences, thus turning the public into a bunch of rationally 
ignorant and disinterested voters being subject to political manipulation (Schumpeter, 
1942/1987: 263). Regarding the relationship with the latter, Schumpeter acknowledged that 
new combinations are typically carried by outsiders to the “core” of the political system and 
their innovative activities face an “enormous economy of force” and resistance by the well-
established actors, thus necessitating low entry barriers into politics so that entrepreneurs 
could implement their programs and policies. This idea was later extended by Tullock (1965) 
and Wohlgemuth (2000), identifying the conditions and institutional reforms that could 
stimulate higher contestability and a higher degree of political innovation.  
Thirdly, the personal qualities and the modes of behaviour of Schumpeterian political leaders 
as well as their motives are conceptually similar to those of Schumpeterian economic leader-
entrepreneurs. The behaviour of both types of entrepreneur is clearly characterised by 
radicalism, with which both types position themselves in the surrounding economic and 
political environment. Instead of working in the deadwood of existing political structures, the 
Schumpeterian political leader would radically change the political terrain. Similarly to the 
Schumpeterian economic entrepreneur, making qualitative non-incremental changes in the 
economic system (introducing new products, developing new production methods, 
discovering new markets or devising new organisational methods), the Schumpeterian 
political entrepreneur makes major punctuations in the political system. He/she expands or 
reduces the intervention of the government, provides new means of public intervention, 
discovers new sources of political support and reorganises his/her political support e.g. gets 
rid of the less politically profitable (François, 2003: 164).  
We argue that the principal features of the Schumpeterian political entrepreneur can be 
equally applied to leaders who instigate policy formation and play a decisive role in it. 
Firstly, Schumpeter’s original conceptualisation of “heroic” entrepreneur and industrial 
leader implies that policy change is not performed by the majority of actors, but by a few 
leaders (both at the time when it is initiated and when it is underway). Also, a certain degree 
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of alienation of this “heroic” entrepreneur from the surrounding environment implies that 
policy change is unlikely to originate from the midst of the policy status quo. Thus we 
postulate that Schumpeterian political entrepreneurs: 
a. Are of rare occurrence and start in the position of minority in the policy system; 
b. Are not likely to originate from the protectionist “iron triangle” (organised interests - 
parliamentary committees – bureaucracy network); and 
c. Are more likely to be independent expert community or stakeholder that is external to 
the policy domain in question, be situated in the top strata of the political system (and 
therefore be insulated from protectionist networks) or at least be located at the fringe 
of the bureaucratic or legislative “core” (e.g. be an open-minded and reform-oriented 
bureaucrat or congressperson). 
Secondly, it is also possible to accommodate Schumpeter’s idea that leaders are driven by 
predominantly non-material impulses and are not pure wealth maximisers; the tangible rents 
resulting from political leadership are therefore not the only incentives for Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship (and are likely to be the side effects of this activity). We argue that this can 
be the case of: expert community and external stakeholders who may be interested in genuine 
social and policy improvements; certain pro-reform bureaucratic factions who are less 
corrupted by vested interests and whose Schumpeterian activities are driven by their 
consciousness and contention that only “good” policies should be devised; and top political 
figures who have higher order priorities – while they are undoubtedly concerned about re-
election and maximisation of political power, their involvement in particular policy area 
emanates from their other motives that are not limited to that area. For example their 
involvement in trade policy domain may be driven by the objective of preservation of good 
relations with other countries to which resolution of trade conflicts could contribute, or the 
conclusion of agreements in other trade negotiation areas. 
Thirdly, regarding the mechanism of political entrepreneurship in the context of policy 
formation or reform, we argue that, similarly to original Schumpeter’s conceptualisation, it 
implies radical reconfiguration of the policy domain, although the means and mechanisms of 
this reconfiguration may be diverse. At the pre-negotiation stage, the reconfiguration of the 
domain is achieved by injecting and forcing new interpretations of policy problems and new 
policy ideas and thereby setting desired agenda for policy formation in a system that is 
dominated by pro-status quo actors. As shown further, this function is performed by three 
types of actors – expert community, pro-reform factions of the domestic agricultural 
bureaucracy, in many instances top national decision makers, as well as by stakeholders who 
are external to the policy domain. At the negotiation stage, the leadership functions are 
exercised by top national decision makers. These are the actors who in normal conditions are 
not involved in given policy area but delegate authority to the lower level of bureaucracy. At 
certain points, when divisions between pro- and anti-reform actors widen and the reform is 
delayed, top policymakers may decide to intervene into the political wrangle, make crucial 
decisions themselves and thus bring reform into existence. 
Fourthly, this representation of leadership implies that the acceptance of entrepreneurial 
proposals (or programs) will be determined by factors other than voting by citizens. While in 
the original Schumpeterian representation the “aye” vote would have been an indication that 
a policy reform program is accepted by the public, selection-by-voting does not play any 
substantial role for the leadership of the expert community and pro-reform bureaucracies. The 
ultimate “consumers” of their entrepreneurial “products” are other, anti-reform bureaucrats 
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(rather than public), and hence different factors such as credibility of persuasion, legitimacy 
of claims, availability of political resources etc. become salient.   
We note that Schumpeter did not confine his analysis of entrepreneurship to the exercise of 
leadership. Insights about non-leadership activities of policy entrepreneurs may be derived 
from Schumpeter’s later analysis of economic entrepreneurs in Business Cycles (1939) (BC). 
Firstly, while in the Theory of Economic Development (TED) the accent was put on a heroic 
industrial leader as initiator and carrier of innovation and on “creative destruction” 
(performed by firms entering the industry and displacing incumbents) as a mechanism of the 
innovation process, in the later works the focus was shifted. Schumpeter recognised that 
entrepreneurship can be exercised collectively (e.g. in corporate entities), inducing 
discontinuities and disruptions of smaller magnitude with “creative accumulation”, associated 
with technological innovation in established firms in the presence of entry barriers to new 
innovators, coming to the forefront (Schumpeter, 1939). As a result, the leadership function 
would become redundant. We argue that this second facet of entrepreneurship can be 
discovered in policymaking. While the Schumpeterian political leader continues to be 
important (challenging the ideational foundations of policy or forcing negotiations into the 
desired direction), many policy innovations can be brought into being without it. This is the 
case of recombinant activities of Schumpeterian policy entrepreneurs at early stages of 
policymaking. Actors conduct trial-and-error tinkering with policy elements and mechanisms 
(adjust instruments, redefine short term goals and targets, without changing the underlying 
ideational and institutional core) and create new analytical instruments that could be helpful 
in discussions at agenda setting stage. Also, in the policy negotiation setting, entrepreneurs 
construct agreement from available proposals, submissions and designs of parties to 
negotiation.  
Secondly, another view contained in BC and later extended by research in structuralist 
economics (Dahmen, 1988) and innovation systems analysis (Lundvall, 1992), is likewise 
applicable in the policy case. The essence of Schumpeter’s insight is that innovation is a 
combination of knowledge drawn from different sources and that a significant portion of 
innovation in modern capitalist economies is a result of collective incremental activities of a 
large number of quite unremarkable actors (rather than heroic figures, as postulated in TED). 
In the same way as Lundvall (1992) argues that innovations may come from the surroundings 
of the firm or from its relations with final users of innovation (customers), the public sector 
or other firms, we hypothesize that policy novelties can be made by non-policymakers, by 
actors somewhat extrinsic to the core of the policy system, e.g. by the expert community. 
And we argue that their contribution, while not radical or decisive as such, can nonetheless 
have significant repercussions for the policy formation process. Thus,   
Proposition 2 The exercise of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship in the policy domain includes 
leadership (political) activities as well as policy innovation through various means, performed 
at both the agenda setting and policy formulation stages. We therefore distinguish between 
Schumpeterian political (Mark I) and policy (Mark II) entrepreneurships.   
5. Complementarity of policy entrepreneurship functions 
Regarding the relationship between Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurship, two 
questions have to be answered: 
1) Do these two types stand for two opposing activities (equilibration and 
disequilibration) or are they two aspects of the same phenomenon? 
2) If the former holds, can they complement each other? 
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The first view that is available in this respect, advanced by Loasby (1982), is that Kirzner and 
Schumpeter envisaged fundamentally different workings of the economy and roles of the 
entrepreneur. The Kirznerian economy moves to equilibrium, assisted by the entrepreneur, 
who exploits discrepancies in the system. Whereas, the Schumpeterian economy moves away 
from equilibrium, driven by the entrepreneur who profits from performing “creative 
destruction” in the economic system. Loasby (1982: 223) says: “Each might be regarded as 
providing opportunities for the other, for example, new combinations brought by 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs attract Kirznerian entrepreneurs who perceive the advantages of 
the new combinations and are eager to share in those advantages.” Yet, says Loasby (1982: 
224), “they do not fit together that well.” The application of this view to policy regime 
dynamics analysis would be problematic: it would mean that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur 
creates a new regime and reaps profits from this, for example, by obtaining some privileged 
position within it. It is not clear, however, where profit opportunities for the Kirznerian 
entrepreneur would be located then.  
The second view available is that the two types are identical (Choi, 1995), i.e. there is one 
entrepreneurship with Kirzner and Schumpeter looking at it from different angles. Kirzner, in 
his 1999 article, argues that there is only one function of entrepreneurs – coordination 
through exploitation of profit opportunities – which in single-period markets is performed 
through price arbitrage (as in Kirzner’s 1973 book), and in multi-period markets through 
coordinative destruction (i.e. destroying, but at the same time improving coordination of the 
economic system, by decreasing misallocations of resources and releasing them to more 
efficient uses). Schumpeterian creative destruction in multi-period markets is thus a sub-type 
of Kirznerian coordination. Kirzner’s insight on multi-period markets is clearly important for 
policy regime analysis. The existing policy regime (and fortunes of many, associated with it) 
of the first period is forcefully eliminated to create a new and superior one in the second 
period. Coordination is performed by means of innovation. It is left unclear which 
instrumental functions are performed when moving from period 1 to period 2. 
The third view, advanced by Boudreaux (1994) is helpful in this sense. While indeed 
equilibration is the only way to push the market towards fulfilment of as yet unfulfilled 
potential and to reform the policy regime towards one with a smaller number of 
contradictions and failures, the means of achieving this may be diverse. We argue, in line 
with Boudreaux, that in the same way as the Schumpeterian entrepreneur contributes to one 
aspect of equilibration (e.g. improves product quality through innovation) and Kirznerian to 
the other one (improves operation of the market), with both improving the functioning of 
economic system, in the policy regime too, both types of entrepreneurs contribute to 
formation of a better regime. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur “produces” new policy and 
“leads” the formation process, whereas the Kirznerian “facilitates” it.  
The complementarity of policy entrepreneurship functions is evidenced in almost all cases of 
major policy reforms. Milestone policy innovations – such as social security arrangements 
and environmental policies instituting protection of workforce (or the environment) against 
excesses of capitalism, or anti-discrimination laws ensuring everyone’s participation in social 
and economic activities – are usually associated with Schumpeterian type leaders. The latter 
use their political power to “push through” policy novelty (e.g. F. D. Roosevelt’s initiative 
and leadership behind the 1935 Social Security Act adoption) or radically change institutional 
and ideational terrain. The examples of the latter are agenda setting leadership of Martin 
Luther King in anti-segregation movement (Bloom, 1987) or Rachel Carson and Ralph Nader 
in the rise of environmentalism (Esposito, 1970). This aspect of policy innovation is typically 
documented and remembered. At the same time, behind the scenes Kirznerian entrepreneurs 
facilitate the passage of policy acts, advocate and campaign for the new policy idea, mobilise 
12 
 
public opinion, mediate the opposing interests and conduct other reform-promoting activities. 
The exercise of Schumpeter Mark II entrepreneurship (operationalisation of policy ideas into 
solid proposals and concepts, construction of policy from various proposals) complements the 
former two types. It is performed by many non-politicians and non-leaders, e.g. work of the 
expert community, production of legislative acts within legislative and judiciary branch and 
government machine at large.  
Based on the above discussion, the following methodological proposition may be made: 
Proposition 3 Multidimensionality of policy entrepreneurship implies that all three 
functions (policy leadership, policy design and policy facilitation) have to be 
performed, if the reform is to culminate in success. These functions do not contradict 
one another, but are complements. 
6. Policy entrepreneurs in agricultural trade policy system 
Having examined generic entrepreneurial functions, it is necessary to determine who 
specifically can act as an entrepreneur and which particular type of entrepreneurship he/she 
will perform. The case of trade policy system (and in particular agricultural trade policy 
system) is considered. 
Our contention is that the same people (or groups) can perform several types of 
entrepreneurship. For instance, national government officials (e.g. the EU Agricultural or 
Trade Commissioner) may act as political leaders (Schumpeter Mark I entrepreneurship) and 
at the same type help devise EU negotiation proposals (Schumpeter Mark II 
entrepreneurship). The case of entrepreneurship by GATT/WTO officials (WTO Director 
General) is similarly ambiguous: the WTO Director General is clearly a political figure and 
thus has the ability to use his power to direct the negotiation process and influence the 
negotiation outcome (Schumpeter Mark I entrepreneurship). He could, however, also behave 
as a mediator and initiator of discussions, thus detecting policy discrepancies (problems with 
operation of international agricultural policies) and facilitating the negotiation process 
(Kirznerian entrepreneurship). At the same time, although not part of the mandate, he could 
participate (and de facto frequently did this) in the negotiation process, by making negotiation 
proposals (Schumpeter Mark II entrepreneurship).  
 
Due to this analytical problem that different types of entrepreneurial functions may be 
performed by different actors during both agenda setting and policy negotiation, it is 
necessary to examine in detail who could be a policy entrepreneur during GATT/WTO 
negotiations. As put by Buchanan (2004: 135), any social state is “brought into being by the 
choices made by many participants along many interdependent dimensions of adjustment”, 
and the exercise of entrepreneurship is no exception. Neither Schumpeterian nor Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship is restricted to activities of top policymakers. The same type of 
entrepreneurial action may be performed by government bureaucrats, officials in international 
organisations, or other participants in the policy process, for example external actors with 
interests in the policy outcome.  
 
The idea that entrepreneurship can happen in bureaucratic settings was advanced by 
Schumpeter in his later works. As put by Ebner (2006: 507), Schumpeter, assuming that 
entrepreneurial leadership in early capitalism is a historically specific phenomenon, predicted 
that in “socialized” or “state” capitalism, entrepreneurship would be performed in the public 
sector by bureaucrats (indeed the state, by performing a range of entrepreneurial functions 
could become an “entrepreneurial state”). References to bureaucratic entrepreneurship 
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(Murphy, 1971; Price, 1971) include entrepreneurship while holding positions in the 
government (so-called executive entrepreneurship), entrepreneurship by those implementing 
policies (administrative entrepreneurship), as well as entrepreneurship by legislatures and the 
judiciary, designing new legislation and rules (legislative entrepreneurship).  
 
As to entrepreneurship by external stakeholders (defined as all actors apart from government 
bureaucrats and international officials), this has been a common practice in numerous 
instances of policymaking. Sebenius (1984), following his participation in UNCLOS III 
(Third United Nations’ Conference on the Law of the Sea), mentioned that the participation 
of external actors, behaving entrepreneurially contributed substantially to the negotiation 
process: 
 
Motivations that were quite apart from national interests of the involved parties prompted 
other individuals and groups to play important roles in the financial negotiations. The 
chairman of NG-2 and his staff, and external groups including Quaker and Methodist 
organizations all developed stakes in the success of the conference and were instrumental in 
bringing about the financial compromises.(p. 18) 
 
We argue that in the GATT/WTO trade talks, four types of actors are likely to perform 
Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurial functions: a) top domestic political leaders 
(heads of state and trade ministers); b) top international bureaucrats (officials in the WTO 
Secretariat, WTO Director General); c) middle level political figures – national negotiators 
and domestic bureaucrats (located across national trade policy systems); and d) external 
stakeholders, including the community of political economists. 
  
Firstly, regarding top national political figures, they are clearly able to use their political 
power and behave as Schumpeterian political entrepreneurs. However due to the immense 
number of issues to attend to, trade negotiations is not always their priority. Their 
involvement in trade issues is therefore occasional and occurs at times when there is a 
negotiation deadlock. In addition, we argue that top national decision makers are able to 
initiate change in policy regime by framing policy issues in a new way and proposing new 
ideas (Schumpeteian political entrepreneurship at agenda setting stage) and are also able to 
act as Kirznerian entrepreneurs during negotiations. 
 
Secondly, as far as top international bureaucrats are concerned, several authors (Hampson, 
Hart, 1995) argue that they are unlikely to perform Schumpeterian political and policy 
entrepreneurship due to their limited capacity and lack of motivation. As to motivation, 
GATT officials of the 1970s-1980s were genuinely interested not only in preservation of the 
existing GATT regime but also in its strengthening and broadening. They were well aware 
that modifications were inevitable and that for instance agriculture had to be seriously tackled 
by the GATT. Hampson and Hart (1995: 193-198) mention, however, that their response was 
bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial. It did not include any attempts to promote new ideas 
or exercise leadership (Schumpeter Mark I entrepreneurship) or to construct policy 
(Schumpeter Mark II entrepreneurship) and was confined to organisational (not substantive) 
matters – the creation of general decision-making procedures, the strengthening of the 
international trade system by reviewing GATT articles, modifying dispute settlement 
procedures and so on. Their limited capacity, as reflected in the mandate, confirms this point. 
As mentioned by O. Long (1985), who himself was a GATT Director General in 1968-1980, 
the functions of the top GATT policymakers were: 
 
14 
 
1) To act as a guardians of the GATT and to use their influence to make governments 
comply with the GATT rules, albeit without having any formal authority to oblige 
them; 
2) To explore the problem areas in international trade policy, to determine the areas to be 
included in forthcoming negotiations and to otherwise act as initiator of negotiations; 
3) To mediate the interests of contracting parties; and 
4) To manage the everyday activities of the GATT. 
 
In other words, GATT bureaucrats were only allowed to perform Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
(point 3 above).
ii
 We argue, however, that in addition to Kirznerian functions which were 
performed ex officio, GATT bureaucrats also acted as Schumpeter Mark I and II 
entrepreneurs. For example, the behaviour of Arthur Dunkel towards the end of the GATT 
Uruguay Round and of Peter Sutherland in the very last stages demonstrates the de facto use 
of political power (Schumpeter Mark I activities), as well as “production” of policy through 
submission of proposals (Schumpeter Mark II activities).  
 
Thirdly, entrepreneurship by national trade policy bureaucrats is inevitable because issues 
discussed in the international domain originate from the domestic system. As Slaughter 
(1997: 183) put it,  
 
Because of the move to international cooperation on previously domestic policy issues it is no 
longer foreign ministries that dominate international diplomacy: instead a number of domestic 
agencies, often with quite distinct agendas, increasingly play active roles.  
 
Winham (1977: 99) similarly states that the common feature of negotiators is that they 
behave in a manner “more akin to that of national bureaucrats than of classical diplomats”. It 
is of interest however whether they behave as entrepreneurs. We agree with the insight of 
Roberts and King (1989) that bureaucrats are no less capable of being entrepreneurs than 
other actors and postulate that the behaviour of many bureaucrats in the executive branch of 
the government and in legislatures both, in the EC and the USA, did not conform to that of 
“classical” bureaucrats and that many of them were able to break the existing policymaking 
routines. We argue that national bureaucrats behaved both as Kirznerian and Schumpeterian 
Mark II entrepreneurs. At pre-negotiation stage they were assisting problem-framing 
entrepreneurship by political economists and other external stakeholders and experimentation 
and learning by other national bureaucrats.  
 
For instance, in the case of agricultural policy in the GATT Uruguay Round, while the 
majority of the national bureaucrats were anti-reformist, the pre-negotiation stage witnessed 
the rise of pro-reform bureaucrats, who contributed substantially to placing agriculture on the 
Uruguay Round agenda. At the core of their Kirznerian entrepreneurship was the building by 
pro-reform bureaucrats of domestic consensus as to the desirability of laissez faire 
agricultural policies. Although it is possible (and is done frequently) for domestic pro-reform 
bureaucrats to impose their will on anti-reform bureaucrats (i.e. to act as Schumpeterian Mark 
I entrepreneurs), we argue that the reality of agricultural policy making (both in the EC and 
the USA) was different: consultation, persuasion and collaboration, rather than use of 
confrontational tactics, were preponderant. Entrepreneurship by national bureaucrats 
continued at negotiation stage, where, in addition to Kirznerian consensus building, they were 
acting as Schumpeter Mark II entrepreneurs, constructing agreement by submitting 
negotiation proposals of varying quality.  
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Fourthly, regarding external stakeholders, their involvement and entrepreneurship in the 
negotiation process is linked to the issue in question: in highly technical negotiations (e.g. on 
arms control or on militarisation of space) the number of external stakeholders will be limited 
and these would include a small club of specialists on the issue. Other, socially sensitive 
negotiations (e.g. on climate change) would include a wide range of stakeholders (NGOs, 
various public figures), usually highly motivated, driven by deep-rooted beliefs and ideology, 
making references to public opinion and campaigning for a particular negotiation outcome. 
We argue that trade negotiations have features of both technical complexity and political 
sensitivity (clearly, some trade negotiations, such as those on genetically modified organisms 
and food safety, are more politically divisive; whereas others, such as intellectual property 
rights negotiations, involve complex legal and scientific issues). The WTO Doha Round talks 
involved substantial political controversy (Seattle clashes) and wide participation of external 
stakeholders due to its development orientation, the active position of the developing nations 
and the rise of the anti-globalist movement. In contrast, during the GATT Uruguay Round 
agricultural talks, the involvement of external actors was more limited in scope, more 
depoliticised and technically oriented. There existed some ambiguity about how to 
operationalise agricultural issues and which aspects of the problem to tackle.  Substantial 
preliminary work in issue definition and quantification of the agricultural problem were 
required, and thus the involvement of agricultural policy professionals (rather than general 
public or groups, interested in political outcome) was natural. Of several possible types of 
specialists, two stand out - lawyers and economists. 
  
Regarding entrepreneurship by lawyers (Hampson, Hart, 1995: 194-196), this was manifested 
in the codification of the international trade law that took place during the Tokyo Round – the 
previously scattered legal provisions on the use of certain instruments were unified in a single 
document (e.g. the Code on Export Subsidies). Another instance of lawyers’ entrepreneurship 
was in putting adversarial trade practices such as the use of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties under legal control. The entrepreneurial activities of lawyers were also salient in the 
pre-negotiation stage with respect to legally undefined trade practices – before such trade 
issues, as intellectual property, investments and services were included in the Uruguay Round 
agenda, the possible agreement templates and potential rules had already been discussed by 
legal scholars in academic journals and conferences. It is clear that codification of existing 
rules and the write up of new ones is a form of Schumpeterian Mark II recombinant 
entrepreneurship, “producing” policy novelties and policy templates.  
 
Regarding the role of economists, Hampson and Hart (1995: 196-198) argue that their 
relative importance in GATT agenda setting has declined since the 1940s.
iii
 This stemmed 
from the following – the development of international trade theory in the post-war period 
resulted in relative detachment of the works of the academic (university) economists (trade 
economists, as well as others) from the realities of GATT policy making. The sophisticated 
models, high degree of formalisation and frequently uncertain predictions made academic 
economic advice less digestible to government officials and negotiators (Evenett, 2007). In 
addition, from an organisational point of view, the GATT over its forty year history became 
rather inimical to the participation of economists.  As distinct from the IMF, World Bank and 
UN, the GATT lacked a formalised structure (and hence employment opportunities for 
economists) until the WTO was formed in 1995.
iv
 As a result, most of the economic analysis 
and formulation of negotiation proposals were conducted by economists of the member states 
located at a national level within respective ministries and departments (interested, in the case 
of agricultural negotiations, in the preservation of the status quo). The GATT Secretariat used 
the services of external political economists rather infrequently – in the early GATT years, 
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when submissions of James Meade (1942/1988) and Claire Wilcox helped the initial 
conception of the GATT and later in 1957, when G. Haberler, J. Tinbergen and R. de Oliveira 
Campos prepared the report on the situation in agricultural markets and the status of domestic 
agricultural policies.  
 
We argue that in the context of the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural talks, political 
economists performed all three types of entrepreneurship – Schumpeter Mark I 
entrepreneurship, when new policy ideas were forced upon the rest of policy system, 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship, when political economists assisted putting agricultural trade 
issues on the Uruguay Round agenda, and Schumpeterian Mark II entrepreneurship at pre-
negotiation stage, when political economists created novel concepts (devised analytical 
instruments and quantified agricultural distortions), thereby operationalising policy 
discussion. 
 
Summarising the above discussion we can put forward the following proposition, 
Proposition 6.1 Both Kirznerian and Schumpeterian (Mark I and II) entrepreneurs are likely to 
be active in international trade policy domain. Entrepreneurs are likely to be active both at 
agenda setting and negotiation stages of policy formulation, as well as at both international 
and domestic levels. The policy entrepreneurship is likely to be performed by national and 
GATT/WTO bureaucrats, lawyers, economists, as well as top political figures.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper elaborated the concept of policy entrepreneurship and considered it to be a major 
determinant of policy process and outcomes and a central component of policy regime 
formation.  
Firstly, a clear distinction between political and policy entrepreneurship was proposed, the 
latter being more appropriate for the analysis of specific policies and policy formation 
processes. 
Secondly, instead of merely identifying policy entrepreneurs, the generic policy 
entrepreneurship functions were examined. Corresponding to these function three types of 
policy entrepreneurship were proposed – entrepreneurial leadership, entrepreneurial 
management and coordination, and entrepreneurial policy innovation. These functions are the 
extension of the theories of economic entrepreneurship proposed by I. M. Kirzner and J. A. 
Schumpeter.  
Thirdly, it was argued that policy entrepreneurship has collective nature, including the efforts 
of politicians, lower-level bureaucrats, economists, non-governmental actors and others. 
Attainment of stable and durable policy regime (i.e. equilibration) is the outcome of activities 
of multiple entrepreneurs. In cases when only one or a limited number of entrepreneurs were 
involved in the process the equilibration process is likely to be compromised. This is in line 
with the hypothesis of Buchanan (2004: 135), of multiple participants and dimensions of 
adjustment during policy formulation. 
Fourthly, we argued that all three types of policy entrepreneurship take place at all stages of 
policy formation: during agenda setting as well as during policy negotiation. 
Fifthly, the issue of equilibration and dis-equilibration in the policy domain was discussed. 
We argued that policy formation process is necessarily an equilibration. Kirznerian and 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship are in this respect the two aspects of the same process. In 
this respect, the effect of entrepreneurial actions is determined not only by their own 
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effectiveness (better proposals, more astute leadership, convincing consensus building), but 
also by their joint effectiveness, i.e. complementarity, when one action amplifies another. 
Finally, an exploration of likely policy entrepreneurship functions and entrepreneurs was 
conducted in trade policy domain. The tentative taxonomy of entrepreneurs in this policy 
domain was presented. 
It is likely that in different policy regime formation processes each of the three generic 
entrepreneurial functions may be exercised more frequently or intensely. In areas of interest 
to the nation as a whole (security policies) or in cases when multiple issues and associated 
parochialism of policy actors are likely to delay formation process (e.g. regional economic 
integration regimes), the exercise of Schumpeterian Mark I leadership function will be 
predominant. In cases when policy regime is not created from scratch, but rather evolves 
from the existing one (domestic macroeconomic policies, regulatory policies in particular 
sectors), or in “wicked” situations, when the nature of the problem and likely solutions are 
not fully understood (e.g. the write up of new rules for climate change regulation or for 
economic exploration of Arctic), Schumpeterian Mark II innovation function will be 
prominent (recombination and learning in the former case, and operationalisation and 
agreement construction in the latter). In cases when the number of veto players or actors with 
diverging views of the future policy is substantial and the policy conflicts are not purely 
material, but rather stemming from ideological and frames’ disharmony, the Kirznerian 
consensus building and coordination are likely to come to the forefront. In order to deal with 
these peculiarities of negotiation types, no adjustment of the proposed framework is required; 
it would be sufficient to perform deeper and more thorough analysis of the dominant type of 
entrepreneurship in the actual case studies.   
It is also likely that the taxonomy of entrepreneurs will differ in every negotiation case, as 
will the specifics of entrepreneurial actions, i.e. the content of reverberation and arguments, 
the substance of threats, the details of domestic constraints’ restructuring and of the new 
bargains and the components of negotiation proposals. In this situation, no generalisation is 
possible (except for stating the importance of looking for entrepreneurs beyond immediate 
negotiators and of checking for interactions and synergies of entrepreneurial actions) with 
these problems dealt with on a case by case basis. 
Regarding the areas of the framework application, these are numerous. Most obvious are the 
studies of the WTO regime formation in various fields (intellectual property, services, 
international investment and global competition policy). It is also possible to validate the 
proposed concepts against agricultural trade debates that have been ongoing in the 
GATT/WTO for decades. The policy entrepreneurship concepts may also be applied to the 
study of trade liberalization on a bilateral and regional basis. Finally, the theoretical 
constructs of this paper are by no means limited to trade issues; hence, the researcher may 
look at other economic regimes (e.g. monetary), or non-economic ones (e.g. security, 
environment).   
The limitations of the analysis in this paper stem from the nature of entrepreneurship. To 
obtain a complete picture of policy formation process an investigation of institutional 
variables (that may constrain entrepreneurial action of affect it in a number of ways) is 
warranted. Also, the role of behavioural (e.g. attitudes to risk, gains and losses) and ideational 
(political and economic philosophy) factors need to be investigated.  
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i
 In the case of trade policy reform, the buyers of the reform (states interested in trade liberalization) 
overoptimistically believe that their offer price is high enough; whereas, the sellers (protectionist states) actually 
consider the price to be too low; thus reform transaction does not occur. When talking about reform price, it 
becomes clear that buyers’ price is not a numerical figure, but rather a bundle of offers and inducements 
contained in a negotiation proposal, which can increase the attractiveness of the latter in the eyes of the reform 
seller. Similarly, the seller price is defined as a set of conditions that a buyer has to fulfil to finalize the reform 
deal. 
ii
 Regarding point 2, it is worth noting that although O. Long mentions the possibility of Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship by the GATT Director General (by initiation of talks), the inclusion of new agendas (such as 
agricultural policy agenda) and the start of respective negotiations was frequently a prerogative of external 
stakeholders. 
iii
 This is at stark contrast with intense advocacy activities of trade economists in a pre-war period. Apart from 
Keynes renunciation of free trade (with repercussions for policy), pro-free trade advocacy was substantial, 
particularly from Geneva based international organizations (League of Nations and International Labour 
Organization). This period witnessed the assault on unilateral trade restrictions and on the bilateral trade idea 
and germination of multilateralism that later became the cornerstone of the GATT (Endres, Fleming, 2002).  
iv
 In these bodies, the role of political economists was substantial – both at the time when they were formed 
(IMF for instance is the result of intellectual and political influence of J. M. Keynes and H. Dexter White, who 
was also a prominent international bureaucrat and IMF Managing Director in the 1940s), and during their 
operation (the contribution of such economists as G. Myrdal, N. Kaldor, M. Kalecki and others).  
